

Grenfell Was Not an Accident: How Warnings Were Ignored and Lives Were Gambled for Profit.

The basis for the similar failures of Awaab Isaak and the 2025 Mould Law.

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In the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, 72 lives were lost in a disaster so horrifying it shocked the nation. Politicians spoke of tragedy. The media talked of failures. But the truth is darker: Grenfell was not an accident. It was the inevitable result of a decadeslong betrayal of fire safety standards — a betrayal driven by profit, masked by bureaucracy, and tolerated by those who knew better.

Early Warnings Ignored: Insurers and Fire Brigades Sound the Alarm

In the 1990s, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) grew increasingly concerned about the spread of combustible materials on building facades.

Under the guidance of insurance firms and fire services, realistic fire tests were carried out at Warrington Fire Research Centre. These were not the sanitized, artificial tests later used. They were full-scale simulations: Test assemblies included realistic façade features, including windows and ventilation openings.. The tests showed, beyond doubt, that Aluminium Composite Material (ACM) panels with polyethylene cores were lethal in a fire.

The conclusion was simple and clear: such materials should never be installed on highrise buildings, especially those with apertures like windows or vents.

The ABI refused to support the widespread installation of these materials. The Fire Brigades Union backed the insurers' warnings.

But their voices were drowned out.

The Manufacturers Strike Back: Standards Are Weakened

Faced with the devastating results of the early fire tests, manufacturers responded not by improving their products but by changing the rules.

A new British Standard, BS 8414, was developed under intense industry lobbying. Where earlier fire tests exposed entire panels to large-scale, fully developed fires, BS 8414 allowed carefully constructed rigs, designed to pass. Other certifications relied on small surface-only tests, where only the aluminium face of a panel was exposed to a flame or heat, hiding the dangerous polyethylene core that burned like petrol when exposed.

The diagrams below illustrate the betrayal:




Figure 1: Anatomy of an ACM Panel showing combustible polyethylene core.




Figure 2: Comparison between early fire tests and BS 8414 rig manipulation.

Here, too, corporate silence and deflection ruled the day. Here, too, ordinary people suffered.

Insurance: From Guardians to Enablers

Despite the ABI's initial opposition, insurance companies continued to underwrite buildings clad in combustible materials. Developers, reassured by certifications crafted by manufacturers, pressed forward with deadly designs. Insurers profited from increased premiums while quietly shifting risk onto occupants who did not know the materials cocooning their homes.

The Role of the Fire Brigades

One might ask: If the Fire Brigade knew from early tests that cladding posed a grave danger, why were fire safety certificates issued?

The answer is devastating: Fire services were sidelined. Operational fire brigades were not tasked with certifying external building materials. That duty fell to Building Control officers — either local authority or privately contracted — who often relied on flawed or manipulated documentation.

Firefighters assumed that the products installed complied with regulatory standards. They were given no authority to test, no power to halt unsafe cladding, and no access to true material data. Post-Grenfell, many firefighters expressed fury and betrayal: they had been "handed a death trap".

Conclusion: A Story of Betrayal

Grenfell Tower burned because early warnings were ignored, manufacturers put profit before lives, insurers abandoned their own alarms, and standards were rewritten to hide the truth.

The names of those who warned are known. So are the names of those who conspired to silence them.

This was not a tragedy of ignorance. It was a tragedy of wilful negligence. And it must never, ever happen again.

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Lessons Learned

The unfortunate comparison between Grenfell and Awaab law

The Grenfell explanation above shows how sales and marketing were coupled with the fear of speaking up against known lies and fallacies. Where interested stakeholders manipulated and ignored facts in return for profit or financial gain.

As with Grenfell, the Awaab case shows how technical truths were manipulated and uncomfortable facts suppressed. In my Awaab Law analysis, I detail how the stakeholders have manipulated facts and fears to protect their interests.

To read my review on Awaab Law and other papers, visit our podcasts.

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